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A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule
By Yale Kamisar

*

The exclusionary rule is being flayed with increasing vigor by a
number of unrelated sources and with a variety of arguments. Some
critics find it unworkable and resort to empirically based arguments.
Others see it as the product of a belated and unwarranted judicial
interpretation.** Still others, uncertain whether the rule works, are
confident that in some fashion law enforcement's hands are tied.
Professor Yale Kamisar, long a defender of the exclusionary rule,
reviews the current attacks on the rule and offers a vigorous rebuttal. t
He finds it difficult to accept that there is a line for acceptable police
conduct that is below the line of a constitutional violation.

The Justices who decided the Weeks case/ barring the use in
federal prosecutions of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and those who handed down the Silverthorne decision,2 invoking what has come to be known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine,~ would, I think, be quite surprised to
learn that some day the value of the exclusionary rule would be
measured by-and the very life of the rule might depend on-an
empirical evaluation of its efficacy in deterring police misconduct. 4
"'Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
""" Over the years, critics of the exclusionary rule have called it all this-and
worse. See, e.g., 8 Wigmore, Evidence § § 2183, 2184 (3d ed. 1940); McGarr,
"The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective Remedy," 52 J. Crim.
L.C. & P.S. 266 ( 1961 ) ; Peterson, "Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure,"
52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 46 (1957); Plumb, "IIIegal Enforcement of the Law," 24
Cornell L.Q. 337, 369-385 (1939); Wilkey, "Why Suppress Valid Evidence?" 13
Prosecutor 124 (1977).

f This is a revised and expanded version of an earlier article that appeared
in 62 Judicature 67 (1978).
1

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

2

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).

Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), refusing to allow the
prosecution to avoid an inquiry into its use of information gained by illegal wiretapping, first used the phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree." See generally Pitler,
"'The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree' Revisited and Shepardized," 56 Calif. L. Rev.
579 (1968).
3

4 In the main, this article seeks to trace, explain, and justify the original
grounding of the exclusionary rule, what has come to be known as "the imperative
of judicial integrity," Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (Stewart,
J.) (overturning the "silver platter" doctrine), quoted with approval in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (Clark, J.) (imposing the exclusionary rule as

5
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Purpose of Rule: Principle or Deterrence?
These Justices were, I think, engaged in a less ambitious venture, albeit a most important one. They were interpreting the
Fourth Amendment as best they could. As they saw it, the rule
that they announced-now known as the federal "exclusionary
rule"-rested on "a principled basis rather than an empirical
proposition." 5
As Professor Francis Allen has recently reminded us, the Weeks
opinion "contains no language that expressly justifies the rule by
reference to a supposed deterrent effect on police officials." 6 Indeed, in the U.S. Supreme Court some thirty-five years were to
pass, as Professor Robert McKay has noted, before Wolf v.
Colorado 1 "introduced the notion of deterrence of official illegality
to the debate concerning the wisdom of the exclusionary rule." 8
to unconstitutionally seized materials on state courts as a matter of Fourteenth
Amendment due process). See also Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall,
JJ., dissenting in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that
a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they
are based on evidence obtained from him by violating the Fourth Amendment).
The Calandra dissenters maintained, and I think they were plainly right, that
"uppermost in the minds of the framers of the [exclusionary] rule" was not "the
rule's possible deterrent effect" but "the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to
avoid the taint of official lawlessness and of assuring the people . . . that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk
of seriously undermining popular trust in government." ld. at 357. See also
Schrock & Welsh, "Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement," 59 Minn. L. Rev. 151 (1974).
Although I have recently learned that one of my earlier defenses of the
exclusionary rule was "atypical," at least for its time, in that it confronted critics
with "substantial data to support the purported merits of the rule" as a deterrent
device (see Comment, "Trends in Legal Commentary on the Exclusionary Rule,"
65 J. Crim. L. & C. 373, 381 (1974) (referring to Kamisar, "Public Safety v.
Individual Liberties: Some 'Facts' and Theories," 53 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 171
(1962), the brief compass of my remarks in the present format does not make
possible an extensive evaluation of the recent "empirical studies" of the exclusionary rule's effects (if any) on police behavior. But the editors of Judicatune
have been most cooperative in permitting me to say a few things on the subject.
See text at notes 117 through 13 6 infra.
5

Cf. Allen, "The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and
the Criminal Cases," 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 518, 536-537 (pointing out that, unlike the
Court's understanding in the formative phases of the exclusionary rule's history,
in recent years the deterrent function has prevailed as its predominant justification, and that "until the rule rests on [returns to?] a principled basis rather than
an empirical proposition," Mapp "will remain in a state of unstable equilibrium").
~

Id. at 536 n.90.

7

338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, note 4 supra.

McKay, "Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and the Right of Privacy,"
15 Ariz. L. Rev. 327, 330 (1973).
8
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As the Weeks Justices saw it, if a court could not "sanction"
a search or seizure before the event-because, for example, the
police lacked sufficient cause to make the search or were unable
to describe the item ( s) they sought with the requisite particularity
-then a court could not, or at least should not, "affirm" or "sanction" the search or seizure after the event.
The courts, after all, are the specific addressees of the constitutional command that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon" certain
prescribed conditions, and if "not even an order of court would
have justified" the police action, as it would not have in Weeks,
then "much less was it within [the officers'] authority" to proceed on their own "to bring further proof [of guilt] to the aid
of the Government." And if the government's agents did proceed
on their own, "without sanction of law," then the government
should not be permitted to use what its agents obtained. The
government whose agents violated the Constitution should be in
no better position than the government whose agents obeyed it:
"[T]he efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment . . . are not to be aided by the sacrifice of [Fourth
Amendment] principles." Is any of this really so hard to follow?

Fresh Look at Old Case
There has been such a heavy emphasis of late on the efficacy
(or inefficacy) of the exclusionary rule in preventing illegal searches
and seizures 9 that it may be profitable to take a fresh look at the
key passages in the old Weeks case:
"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United
States and Federal officials in the exercise of their power and authority,
under limitations and restraint as to the exercise of such power and
authority.... This protection [against unreasonable search and seizure]
reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving
to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal
system with the enforcement of the laws [including the courts; indeed,
especially the courts]. The tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws [to] obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizures ... should
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all
times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all
conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
9

See notes 4 and 5 supra.
7
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". . . The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment ... are not to be aided by the sacrifice of [Fourth Amendment] principles. . . . The United States Marshall acted without sanction
of law . . . and under color of his office undertook to make a seizure
of private papers in direct violation of the constitutional prohibition
against such action. Under such circumstances, without sworn information and particular description, not even an order of court would
have justified such procedure, much less was it within the authority of
the United States Marshall to thus invade the house and privacy of the
accused. . . . To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against such unauthorized action." 10

Although the Fourth Amendment constitutes a guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not, of course,
explicitly state what the consequences of a violation of the guarantee should be. This "specific" of the Bill of Rights turns out, as
is so often the case, 11 not to be specific about the issue that confronted the Weeks Court and that is the subject of today's debate.

Weeks Case Not Strained
This means only that, here as elsewhere-almost everywherethe court "cannot escape the demands of judging or of making ...
difficult appraisals." 12 But what is wrong with the Weeks Court's
appraisal? Does its reading of the Fourth Amendment do violence
to the language or purpose of the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure? Does its interpretation of this constitutional
provision require an active imagination? Is the interpretation
strained, illogical, or implausible?
It is plain that Holmes and Brandeis thought not. In the Silverthorne case, Holmes, joined by Brandeis and five other Justices,
observed:
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
10

Weeks v. United States, note 1 supra, at 392-394.

11

See, e.g., Friendly, "The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,"

53 Calif. L. Rev. 929, 937, 954 (1965); Kadish, "Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism," 66 Yale L.J. 319, 337-339
(1957); Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (1959).
12 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1973) (Goldberg, J.). See also
Friendly, note 11 supra, at 937-938.
8
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before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does
not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible.
If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may
be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's
own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed." 13

The Views of Holmes and Brandeis
The Olmstead case14 involved two questions, both answered in
the negative by a 5-4 majority: ( 1) Are telephone messages within
the protection against unreasonable search and seizure? (2) Even
if they are not, should the evidence nevertheless be excluded because the federal agents who tapped the phones thereby violated
a state statute? On the second issue, the majority, per Chief Justice
Taft, did not challenge the Weeks rule but insisted that "the exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases [such as Weeks] where
rights under the Constitution would be violated by admitting it." 15
Holmes and Brandeis argued that "apart from the Constitution the
Government ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act." 16 Their arguments as to why the exclusionary rule should apply to illegal, as well as unconstitutional,
police action are essentially restatements, although more famous
and most eloquent ones, of the reasoning in Weeks.
First, Holmes:
"If [the Government] pays its officers for having got evidence by crime
I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same
way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if
it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in the future it will
pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government would
play an ignoble part.

"For those who agree with me, no distinction can be taken between the
Government as prosecution and the Government as judge. If the existing
code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty
business it does not permit the judge to allow such inequities to succeed. . . . I am aware of the often repeated statement that in a criminal
proceeding the Court will not take notice of the manner in which papers
lS

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, note 2 supra.

14

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 ( 1928).

111Jd. at 468 (emphasis added).
16Jd. at 469-4 70 (dissenting; opinion).

9
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offered in evidence have been obtained. But that somewhat rudimentary
mode of disposing of the question has been overthrown by Weeks [and]
the reason for excluding evidence obtained by violating the Constitution
seems to me logically to lead to excluding evidence obtained by a crime
of the officers of the law." 17

Then Brandeis:
"When these unlawful acts were committed, they were crimes only of
the officers individually. The Government was innocent, in legal contemplation; for no federal official is authorized to commit a crime on its
behalf. When the Government, having full knowledge, sought . . . to
avail itself of the fruits of these acts in order to accomplish its own ends,
it assumed moral responsibility for the officers' crimes. . . . And if this
Court should permit the Government by means of its officers' crimes, to
effect its purpose of punishing the defendant, there would seem to be
present all the elements of a ratification ....
"Will this Court by sustaining the judgment below sanction such conduct
on the part of the Executive?
" ... The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the
law in connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal
redress .... It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in order
to promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination. . . .
"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." 18

Impact of Weeks and Olmstead
I doubt that I ever fully appreciated the force of the Weeks
opinion and the Holmes-Brandeis dissents in Olmstead until some
fifteen years ago, when an incident occurred in Minnesota, where
I was then teaching. Until 1961, the Minnesota courts, as well
as the courts of about half of our states, had permitted the use of

11

Id. at 470-471 (dissenting opinion).

18

!d. at 483-485 (dissenting opinion).
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unconstitutionally seized evidence. The Mapp decision and the
imposition of the exclusionary rule on Minnesota and other "admissibility states" as a matter of federal constitutional law caused
much grumbling in police ranks. This led Minnesota's young attorney general, Walter Mondale, to remind the police that "the
language of the Fourth Amendment is identical to the [search and
seizure provision] of the Minnesota State Constitution" and that
"Mapp did not alter one word of either the state or national constitutions." 19 The Mapp case, stressed Mondale, had "not reduce[d]
[lawful] police powers one iota": "[W]hat was a reasonable search
before, still is." 20 At a subsequent panel discussion on the law of
search and seizure in which I participated, proponents of the exclusionary rule quoted Mondale's remarks and made explicit what
those remarks implied: If the police feared that evidence they were
gathering in the customary manner would now be excluded by
the courts, the police must have been violating the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure all along. This evoked
illuminating responses from the two law enforcement panelists,
responses that I think underscore the need for, and the great symbolic value of, the "exclusionary rule":
"Minneapolis City Attorney Keith Stedd: 'I don't think it [is] proper
for us to [say that prior to Mapp the police were violating the law all
along] when the courts of our state were telling the police all along that
the [exclusionary rule] didn't apply in Minnesota.'
"St. Paul Detective Ken Anderson: 'No officer lied upon the witness
stand. If you were asked how you got your evidence you told the truth.
You had broken down a door or pried a window open . . . often we
picked locks. . . . The Supreme Court of Minnesota sustained this time
after time. . . . [The] judiciary okayed it; they knew what the facts
were.' " 21

There is no reason to think that the Minnesota experience is
unique. The heads of our greatest police departments also reacted
to the adoption of the exclusionary rule as if the guarantees against
unreasonable search and seizure had just been written.
19 Mondale, "The Problem of Search and Seizure," 19 Bench & B. Minn. 15,
16 (Feb. 1962). See also Kamisar, "Mondale on Mapp," Civ. Lib. Rev. 62
(Feb./ March 1977).
2o

Mondale, note 19 sup·ra, at 16.

21 Quoted in Kamisar, "On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics
of the Courts," 49 Cornell L.Q. 436, 442-443 (1964).
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Thus, shortly after California adopted the exclusionary rule, 22
William Parker, then Los Angeles Chief of Police, warned that
his department's "ability to prevent the commission of crime has
been greatly diminished" because henceforth his officers would
be unable to take "affirmative action" unless and until they possessed "sufficient information to constitute probable cause." 23 He
did promise, however, that "as long as the Exclusionary Rule is
the law of California, your police will respect it and operate to the
best of their ability within the framework of limitations imposed
by that rule." 24
Similarly, former New York Police Commissioner Michael
Murphy recalled how, when Mapp v. Ohio 25 imposed the exclusionary rule on New York and other heretofore "admissibility
states," he,
"as the then commissioner of the largest police force in this country ...
was immediately caught up in the entire problem of reevaluating our
procedures . . . and modifying, amending and creating new policies and
new instructions for the implementation of Mapp. Retraining sessions
had to be held from the very top administrators down to each of the
thousands of foot patrolmen and detectives engaged in the daily basic
enforcement function." 26

Commissioner Murphy, no less than Chief Parker, seemed to
think that "the framework of limitations" restraining the police had
been put there by the exclusionary rule, not by the state and federal
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure.
"Flowing from the Mapp case," he said, "is the issue of defining
probable cause to constitute a lawful arrest and subsequent search
and seizure." 27
Criticism of Exclusionary Rule Illogical

I think it may forcefully be argued that it is not the exclusionary rule that is illogical or misdirected, but, rather, much of the
22

People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 ( 1955).
Parker, Police 117 (Wilson, Ed., 1957).
24Jd. at 131 (emphasis added).
25 367 u.s. 643 (1961).

23

26 Murphy, "Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The
Problem of Compliance by Police Departments," 44 Texas L. Rev. 939, 941
(1966).
2 7 Id. at 943.
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criticism it has generated. As Senator Robert Wagner pointed
out in the 1938 New York State Constitution Convention:
"All the arguments [that the exclusionary rule will handicap law enforcement] seem to me to be properly directed not against the exclusionary
rule but against the substantive guarantee itself. . . . It is the [law of
search and seizure], not the sanction, which imposes limits on the operation of the police. If the rule is obeyed as it should be, and as we declare it should be, there will be no illegally obtained evidence to be excluded by the operation of the sanction.

"It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the exclusionary rule on the
ground that it will hamper the police, while making no challenge to the
fundamental rules to which the police are required to conform." 28

If it is true, as Cooley said of the Fourth Amendment 110 years
ago, that "it is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished
than that a citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his
trunks broken up, [or] his private books, papers, and letters exposed to prying curiosity," 29 why is it no less true when the accused's premises have been invaded or his constitutional rights
otherwise violated? If the government could not have gained a
conviction had it obeyed the Constitution, why should it be permitted to prevail because it has violated the Constitution? 30 And

2 81 New York Constitutional Convention, Revised Record 560 (1938),
reprinted in Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law and Its Administration 1191-1192
(1940). See also Traynor, J., in People v. Cahan, note 22 supra, at 450, 282
P.2d at 914:

"Cases undoubtedly arise where a violation of the privilege against selfincrimination, a coerced confession, the testimony of defendant's spouse, a
violation of the attorney-client privilege or other privileges is essential to the
conviction of the criminal, but the choice has been made that he go unpunished. Arguments against the wisdom of these rights and privileges, just as
arguments against the wisdom of the prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures, should be addressed to the question whether they
should exist at all, but arguments against the wisdom of the constitutional
provisions may not be invoked to justify a failure to enforce them while they
remain the law of the land."
29

Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 306 (1st ed. 1868).

30

See Allen, "Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf,"
1961 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 34; Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," 25 Colum. L. Rev. 11, 25 (1925). True,
in a goodly number of cases the government might still have obtained a conviction
even if it had obeyed the Constitution, but critics of the exclusionary rule would
allow the conviction to stand even if it could have been secured only by violating
the Constitution.
13
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why does disallowing the government to reap an advantage that
it secured, and might only have been able to secure, by violating
the Constitution generate so much popular hostility?
No one, I think, has supplied a more discerning and more
felicitous explanation than Professor John Kaplan (one of the
sharpest critics of the exclusionary rule) :
"From a public relations point of view [the exclusionary rule] is the
worst possible kind of rule because it only works at the behest of a
person, usually someone who is clearly guilty, who is attempting to prevent the use against himself of evidence of his own crimes .... [But the]
fact is that any rule which actually enforced the demands of the Fourth
Amendment (whatever they may be) would prevent the conviction of
those who would be caught through evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The problem with the exclusionary rule is that it
works after the fact, so that by then we know who the criminal is, the
evidence against him, and the other circumstances of the case. If there
were some way to make the police obey, in advance, the commands of
the Fourth Amendment, we would lose at least as many criminal convictions as we do today, but in that case we would not know of the evidence
which the police could discover only through a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. It is possible that the real problem with the exclusionary
rule is that it flaunts before us the price we pay for the Fourth Amendment." 31

"Time Lag" Argument Also Weak
The federal exclusionary rule has been disparaged on the
ground that "it was not adopted by the United States Supreme
Court untill914" and that despite the possibility that "an interpretation first made 125 years [actually 123] after a constitutional
provision might nonetheless be an appropriate one, the time lag
between the adoption of the Fourth Amendment and the first appearance of the exclusionary rule is at least some indication that

Even when the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence in a criminal trial
"automatically required" reversal (this no longer seems to be the case, see
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970) ), a conviction could have been
obtained on retrial on the basis of untainted evidence. Moreover, if knowledge
derived from an unconstitutional search is gained from an "independent source"
or undoubtedly would have been lawfully discovered in the normal course of
events, it can be admitted into evidence. See generally Kamisar, LaFave & Israel,
Modern Criminal Procedure 698-721 (4th ed. 1974). Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 406-407 n.12 (1977).
31

Kaplan, Criminal Justice 215-216 (2d ed. 1978).
14
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it was hardly basic to the constitutional purpose." 32 This doesn't
strike me as much of an argument.
Some 160 years after the adoption of the First Amendment,
the "prevention and punishment" of "the lewd and obscene, the
profane [and] the libelous" were still thought to raise no constitutional problems. 33 Indeed, the time lag between the adoption of
the First Amendment and the first articulation of the "clear and
present danger" test34-what may fairly be called "the start of the
law of the First Amendment" 35-was 128 years. And, of course,
32 Kaplan, "The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule," 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027,
1030-1031 (1974). As Dean Griswold has pointed out, "except for the Bvyd
case [Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)], virtually no search and seizure
cases were decided by the Supreme Court in the first 11 0 years of our existence
under the Constitution." Griswold, Search and Seizure: A Dilemma of the SupremeCourt2 (1975).
The view that illegally seized evidence should be excluded was first laid down
by way of dictum in Boyd, which went to great lengths to assert a connection
between the Fourth Amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination,
although the case could have been decided on the self-incrimination clause alone.
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1903), appeared, by dictum, to repudiate
the Boyd dictum. Thus the exclusionary rule was adopted in Weeks "following
an earlier and seemingly inconsistent start." Reynard, "Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right?" 25 Ind. L.J. 259,
306-307 ( 1950). See generally Atkinson, note 30 supra, at 13.-17; Fraenkel,
"Concerning Searches and Seizures," 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 366-372 ( 1921);
Notes, 56 Yale L.J. 1076, 1077-1078 n.ll (1947), 58 Yale L.J. 144, 148-151
( 1948). "Apparently the first case to hold that evidence illegally seized, as distinguished from compelled in testimony, was inadmissible, was United States v.
Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832 (D. Vt. 1899), which on very different facts,
cited the Boyd case as authority for the holding." ld. at 150 n.25.
Professor Kaplan also observes that "the exclusionary rule was not imposed
upon the states until 1961, and then by a divided Supreme Court." Note 32
supra at 1031. But the Supreme Court never addressed the issue until 1949, in
Wolf, and that decision was also by a divided Court ( 6-3). Over the years, of
course, Weeks and Mapp have caught heavy criticism, but so, it should be remembered, did Wolf. See Beisel, Control Over Illegal Enforcement of the Criminal
Law: Role of the Supreme Court 55-59 (1955); Allen, "The Wolf Case: Search
and Seizure, Federalism, and Civil Liberties," 45 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1950); Frank,
"The United States Supreme Court: 1948-1949," 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 32-34
(1950); Kamisar, "Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in
State and Federal Courts," 43 Minn. L. Rev. 1083 (1959); Paulsen, "Safeguards
in the Law of Search and Seizure," 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 65, 72-76 ( 1957); Reynard,
supra, at 306-313. See also Pollak, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Judgment and the
Fourteenth Amendment," 67 Yale L.J. 304, 320-321 & n.105 (1957).

83

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 ( 1952) (Frankfurter, J.).

84

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 ( 1919); Debs v. United States, 249
(1919).

u:s. 211

a11 Kalven, "Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition," 40 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 235, 236 (1973).
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the development of the important "void for vagueness" and "overbreadth" doctrines in this area-"judge-made" or "judicially created" remedies fortissimo-did not come until stilllater. 36
The time lag between the adoption of the Fifth Amendment
and the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination to
the proceedings in the police station as well as those in the courtroom was 175 years. 37 As for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it was not until 193 838-fairly early in the development of
constitutional-criminal procedure but still a quarter of a century
later than Weeks-that "the right to counsel in federal courts
meant more than that a lawyer would be permitted to appear for
the defendant if the defendant could afford to hire one." 39 Moreover, as Justice Schaefer sadly noted in his memorable Holmes
Lecture, delivered seven years before Gideon, 40 "in some states it
means no more than that today." 41
All Cases Involve "Judicial Implication"

The federal exclusionary rule has also been disparaged as not
ierived from "the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendnent," but only "a matter of judicial implication." 42 This does
not strike me as much of a point either-not, at least, unless somebody can cite me one Supreme Court case interpreting the Constitution that is not "a matter of judicial implication."
The most celebrated constitutional-criminal procedure cases of

36 See Lockhart, Kamisar & Choper, Constitutional Law 815-822 (4th ed.
1975).

37 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Kamisar, "A Dissent From
the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the 'New' Fifth Amendment and the
Old 'Voluntariness' Test," 65 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 65, 77-83 (1966).

38

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

39 Schaefer, "Federalism and State Criminal Procedure," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
2 (1956).

4°

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

41

Schaefer, note 39 supra, at 2.

42 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). The point has been made
more strongly. See McGarr, "The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill-Conceived and
Ineffective Remedy," 52 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 266, 269 (1961), reprinted in
Police Power and Individual Freedom 99, 103 (Sowle, Ed., 1962) (Weeks "is a
piece of pure J udiciallegislation").
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our times are Johnson v. Zerbst 43 and Gideon v. Wainwright/ 4 requiring appointment of counsel in all federal and state prosecutions, respectively, when a defendant is unable to pay for the
services of an attorney. But one searches the language of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments in vain for any mention of indigent
defendants or the assignment or appointment of counsel at triallet alone at preliminary hearings, 45 at lineups, 46 in the police station/7 on appeal, 48 or in juvenile court proceedings. 49 Nor does
the Sixth Amendment or any other part of the Constitution have
anything to say about the effective assistance of counsel-although
the courts have had a good deal to say about it. 50 Nor does the
Constitution have anything to say about whether a defendant who
wants to represent himself can be forced to accept a lawyer against
his wil/. 51
The right to counsel has well been called "the most pervasive
right" of an accused, 52 but all the Constitution has to say about it
is that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... have the
Assistance of Counsel." 53 That's all. The considerable body of
constitutional law that has emerged in this important area has all
been "a matter of judicial implication." 54
43

Note 38 supra.

44

Note 40 supra.

41>

See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).

46 Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), with Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).

47 Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v.
Arizona, note 37 supra, with Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
48

417

Compare Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), with Ross v. Moffit,

u.s. 600 (1974).

49

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

50 See cases and authorities collected and discussed in Kamisar, LaFave &
Israel, note 30 supra, at 60-63, and 1978 S~pplement at 16-19.
111

See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 ( 1975).

112

See Schaefer, note 39 supra, at 8.

118

U.S. Const. Amend. VI.

114

So, of course, have the limitations placed on the exclusionary rule, e.g.,
standing, the attenuation of taint from illegal searches, and the use of illegally
seized evidence in grand jury proceedings or for impeachment purposes, which
limitations are said to undermine the "judicial integrity" rationale of the exclusionary rule (see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 ( 1976), discussed in Israel,
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Analogy to Prohibition of Involuntary Confessions

And whence came the. rule-first applied in 193655 but shaped
and reshaped in the course of the following three decades 56-barring the use of "involuntary" confessions as a matter of Fourteenth
Amendment due process? Talk about "judge-made" or "judicially
created" rules! The Constitution has nothing to say about "confessions" or "admissions," either "involuntary" or of any other
kind.
It will not do to point to the constitutional prohibition against
"compell[ing]" a person to be "a witness against himself" in "any
criminal case." 57 For the privilege was not deemed applicable to
the states unti11964, 58 and by that time the U.S. Supreme Court
had decided some thirty state confession cases. Moreover, as
noted earlier, even if the privilege against self-incrimination had
been deemed applicable to the states, the law pertaining to "coerced" or "involuntary" confessions still would have developed
without it. For until Miranda, 59 the prevailing view was that because police officers lacked legal authority to compel statements,
there was no legal obligation to answer to which a privilege could
apply, and thus the privilege did not extend to the police station. 60
As late as April 1966, Chief Justice Roger Traynor pointed out
that although "the Fifth Amendment has long been the life of the

"Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court,"
75 Mich. L. Rev. 1319, 1410-1412 (1977)) and make the exclusionary rule
"not 'look' like a constitutional doctrine" (Kaplan, note 34 supra, at 1030).
55

Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

00 See Kamisar, "What Is an 'Involuntary' Confession?" 17 Rutgers L. Rev.
728 (1963).

57

U.S. Const. Amend. V.

5 8 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). "In extending the privilege against
self-incrimination to the states and at the same time indicating that the privilege
has been the unseen governing principle of the confession cases, Malloy forcefully
brought the Fifth Amendment to bear on the interrogation problem." Schaefer,
The Suspect and Society 16 (1967). The "intertwined doctrines" (the "voluntariness standard" and the privilege against self-incrimination), noted Justice Schaefer
in a postscript to his 1966 Rosenthal Lectures, "were fused in Miranda." Id. at
85 n.31.
59

Miranda v. Arizona, note 37 supra.

ao See the discussion in Kamisar, note 37 supra, at 65, 77-83.
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party in judicial or legislative proceedings, . . . it has had no life
it could call its own in the pre-arraignment stage." 61
Nor is it a sufficient answer to say that Fourteenth Amendment
due process bars convictions based on inherently untrustworthy
evidence (long a universally accepted view but, incidentally, not
an explicit requirement of the due process clause either). This
does not explain why the question of the admissibility of an "involuntary" confession must be "answered with complete disregard
of whether or not petitioner in fact spoke the truth" 62 and why "a
legal standard which took into account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity . . . is not a permissible standard under the
Due Process Clause." 03 It does not explain why involuntary confessions "are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even
though statements contained in them may be independently established as true." 64
Nor does it explain the "rule of automatic reversal"-the rule,
formulated by the Stone and Vinson Courts and reaffirmed by the
Warren Court, that the introduction of an "involuntary" statement
at the trial necessitates reversal, regardless of how much untainted
evidence remains to support the conviction. 65 As Professor Bernard
Meltzer asked more than twenty years ago:
"If the Fourteenth Amendment is a guarantee only against conviction on
inherently untrustworthy evidence, why reverse when, with the involuntary evidence aside, there is ample trustworthy evidence to support the
conviction? Why not indeed recognize, as some states had, that inde6l Traynor, "The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Trial," 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 669 (1966).
6 2 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).
68 I d. at 543.
6 4 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (relying in large part on
rationale of coerced confession cases to exclude evidence produced by "stomach
pumping").

65 See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n.1 ( 1944); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401,404 (1945); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948);
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560, 567-568 (1958); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 621 ( 1961); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,
518-519 (1963).
Apparently, the "rule of automatic reversal" still applies to "coerced" or
"involuntary" confessions (see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8
(1967)), but not to Massiah (Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964))
or Miranda violations. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); United
States v. Sanchez, 422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Jackson, 429
F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1970).
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pendent evidence derived from, and corroborating, the coerced confession, renders it trustworthy and admissible?" 66

Attempts to Distinguish Involuntary Confession Cases

It is understandable that critics of the search and seizure exclusionary rule would try to distinguish away the coerced confession cases. 67 For once it becomes clear that the rationale of the
coerced confession cases "has been expanded beyond protect[ ing]
the individual from conviction on unreliable or untrustworthy
evidence" to "strik[ing] down police procedures which in their
general application appear to the prevailing justices as imperiling
basic individual immunities" 6 s-and this was clear to Professor
Francis Allen as far back as 1950-.then it becomes most difficult
to distinguish the problem of the admission of unconstitutionally
seized "real" evidence from that of "involuntary" confessions. For
"in both situations the perils arise primarily out of the procedures
employed to acquire the evidence rather than from dangers of the
incompetency of the evidence so acquired." 69
Although those unhappy with the exclusionary rule still make
the claim that the admissibility of unconstitutionally seized "real"
evidence and "involuntary" confessions "raise[s] entirely different
questions," 70 the argument comes about thirty years too late. 71
66 Meltzer, "Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 348 (1954).
67 Thus, in criticizing the exclusionary rule as to unconstitutionally seized
materials, Professor Charles Alan Wright notes: "[W]e are talking only of what
lawyers call 'real' evidence. Involuntary confessions and other evidence of that
kind raise entirely different questions. Innocent men may give false confessions
if sufficient pressure is put upon them by the police. The murder weapon, the
envelope of narcotics, the gambling slips, however, speak for themselves." Wright,
"Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?" 50 Texas L. Rev. 736,
737 (1972). (Don't murder weapons and narcotics obtained as a result of
involuntary confessions "speak for themselves" too?) See also Wilkey, "Why
Suppress Valid Evidence?" 13 Prosecutor 124 (1977): "In exclusionary rule
cases involving material evidence there is never any question of reliability. Reliability is in question, for example, with a coerced confession. . . . Exclusion of
evidence is then proper, because the evidence is inherently unreliable."

68 Allen, "The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism and the Civil
Liberties," 45 III. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1950).

69Jd.
70

See note 67 supra.

71

See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 ( 1949), and companion cases, reversing
convictions based on "involuntary" confessions, despite dissenting Justice Jack-
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It is interesting to note that at one point Chief Justice Warren's
opinion for the Court in the famous Spano case reads like a restatement of the reasoning in Weeks and the Holmes-Brandeis dissents
in Olmstead:
"The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does
not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
the actual criminals themselves." 72

One of Justice Frankfurter's last opinions on the subject-and
I must confess that I find it rather mystifying that the author of
Wolf would write this and do so the same Term he dissented in
Mapp-perhaps best suggests the close affinity between the Weeks
rule and the coerced confession rationale. Speaking for a 7-2 majority in Rogers v. Richmond, Justice Frankfurter observed:
"Our decisions under [the Fourteenth] Amendment have made clear that
convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which
are involuntary ... cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them
offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law:
that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system. . . . To be
sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been, to an unascertained extent, found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on
this consideration. Indeed, in many of the cases in which the command
of the Due Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions
involving the use of confessions obtained by impermissible methods, in-

son's undisputed assertions that "checked with external evidence, [the confessions
in each case] are inherently believable, and were not shaken as to the truth by
anything that occurred at the trial." Id. at 57-58. See also Rochin v. California,
note 64 supra, at 172-173: "It has long ceased to be true that due process of
law is needless of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evidence
is obtained. This was not true even before the series of ·recent cases enforced
the constitutional principle that the States may not base convictions upon confessions, however much verified, obtained by coercion. . . . To attempt in this
case to distinguish what lawyers call 'real evidence' from verbal evidence is to
ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions." See generally Beisel,
Control Over Illegal Enforcement of the Criminal Law: Role of the Supreme Court
70-86 (1955); Allen, note 68 supra, at 26-29; Allen, "Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look," 48 Nw. U. L. Rev. 16, 20-25 (1953); Meltzer,
note 66 supra, at 326-329, 343, 347-349; Paulsen, "The Fourteenth Amendment
and the Third Degree," 6 Stan. L. Rev. 411, 417-423 (1954).
72

Spano v. New York, note 65 supra, at 320-321.
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dependent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the truth of what
the defendant had confessed. Despite such verifications, confessions
were found to be the product of constitutionally impermissible methods
in their inducement. Since a defendant had been subjected to pressures
to which, under our accusatorial system, an accused should not be subjected, we were constrained to find that the procedures leading to his
conviction had failed to afford him that due process of law which the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees." 73

Tort Remedies Not Suggested for Involuntary Confessions
If a conviction rests in part on an independently corroborated

and concededly truthful confession (albeit one found to be the
product of constitutionally impermissible methods), why can't the
conviction stand? Why not remand those who have made such
confessions, together with those who were subjected to, but managed to remain silent in the face of, impermissible interrogation
methods, "to the remedies of private action and such protection
as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert
public opinion, may afford"? 74 Granting that in practice the exclusion of involuntary but verified confessions may be an effective
way of deterring objectionable interrogation methods, why must
the Court "condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other
methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally
effective"? 75
Moreover, if the imperqiissible police methods that produce
involuntary confessions are typically more offensive to the dignity
of the individual and more often characterized by violence than
are unconstitutional searches and seizures, are not these objectionable interrogation methods more likely to attract the interest of
the press, more likely to arouse community opinion, more likely
to excite the sympathy of jurors? Why, then, is the Court unwilling
to rely on tort actions, criminal prosecutions, and internal police
discipline to check impermissible police interrogation practices?
Why does the "command" of the due process clause "compel" the

78

Note 62 supra at 540-541.

74

Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).

75

Cf. id.
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Court to reverse the conviction? w Why can't the conviction
stand? 77
If the reason is-and, at a time when the privilege against selfincrimination was deemed inapplicable, it is difficult to see what
else the reason might have been-that to uphold a conviction resting in part on an "involuntary" confession, however much verified,
would be to "sanction" the objectionable methods that produced
it and to afford these methods "the cloak of law," 78 then we have
merely arrived at the insight that the Weeks Court and Justices
Holmes and Brandeis expressed long ago.
Examination of Wolf Case
That a majority of the Court would conclude in 1949, as it
did in Wolf v. Colorado, 79 that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
prevent a state court from admitting evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure, and that Justice Frankfurter would
write the opinion of the Court, is not surprising. For Justice Frankfurter's and his brethren's "notions of the obligations of federalism
were a strongly limiting influence on [their] role in the criminal
cases during the years before the Warren tenure," 80 and the Wolf
case "provided an important demonstration of the Court's essential fidelity to the assumptions of a federal system at a time when
[the Court] was being subjected to extreme and irresponsible
charges of usurpation of power." 81 Nevertheless, one is (or ought
76

Cf. Rogers v. Richmond, note 62 supra, quoted in text at note 73 supra.

77/d. See also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339 (1943), where,
before putting aside constitutional issues and invoking its supervisory powers over
federal criminal justice, the Court noted, per Justice Frankfurter: "It is true, as
the petitioners assert, that a conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of
which is evidence obtained in disregard of liberties deemed fundamental by the
Constitution, cannot stand. Boyd v. United States; Weeks v. United States . . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
78 Cf. Rochin v. California, note 64 supra, at 173-174: "Coerced confessions
offend the community's sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction [the
'stomach pumping' which produced the morphine capsules] ... would be to afford
brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law
and thereby brutalize the temper of a society."
79

Note 74 supra.

80 Allen, "The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases," 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 518, 526.
81

Allen, "Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf,"
1961 S. a. Rev. 1, 5.
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to be) taken aback by Justice Frankfurter's reasoning in Wolf:
The protection against unreasonable search and seizure is "basic
to a free society," is "enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause," but a conviction resting on evidence obtained
in disregard of this fundamental and constitutionally protected
right can stand-that, if I may be permitted to quote what I said
about the Wolf case nineteen years ago, "this is an instance where
one may be . . . imprisoned on evidence obtained in violation of
due process and yet not be deprived of life or liberty without due
process of law after all." 82
Justice Frankfurter and the McNabb Case
Justice Frankfurter, no less than Justice Day in Weeks, assumed elsewhere that permitting evidence obtained in violation of
a law to be made the basis of a conviction would "stultify the
policy" manifested by the law. 8H And perhaps no jurist since
Holmes and Brandeis balked as much as Frankfurter at the courts'
becoming "accomplices" in police lawlessness by sustaining a conviction resting on evidence obtained by violation of law. The cases
discussed above involving "involuntary" confessions that bear the
stamp of verity illustrate this point, at least implicitly. But Justice
Frankfurter was more explicit. In the famous MeN abb case, he
observed, for a 7-1 majority:
"A statute [providing that arrestees promptly be taken before the nearest
judicial officer] is expressive of a general legislative policy to which courts
should not be heedless when appropriate situations call for its application.
" . . . Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a
flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded
82 Kamisar, "Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in
State and Federal Courts," 43 Minn. L. Rev. 1083, 1108 (1959).
A decade later, Justice Frankfurter protested that Wolf did not mean that
the substantive scope of the Fourth Amendment as such applies to the states via
Fourteenth Amendment due process, that Wolf did not mean that every search
and seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment would make the same conduct
on the part of state officials a violation of the Fourteenth. See his dissent in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 233, 237-240 (1960). But most members
of the Court did read Wolf this way. See Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court
in id. at 212-215; and Justice Clark's opinion for the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 650-651, 654-656 (1961). For reasons spelled out at length in Kamisar,
supra, at 1101-1108, I think the Mapp and Elkins Courts properly read Wolf as
equating the substantive scope of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
83

See McNabb v. United States, note 77 supra, quoted in text at note 84 infra.
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cannot be aiJowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law. Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured [no more than did the draftsmen
of the Fourth Amendment]. But to permit such evidence to be made
the basis of a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy
which Congress has enacted into law.
" ... We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so
far as courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement. We
hold only that a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of
justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted
upon evidence secured under the circumstances revealed here. In so
doing, we respect the policy which underlies Congressional legislation." 84

It will not do to dismiss McNabb as an instance of the Court's

exercise of its supervisory powers over federal criminal justice.
Either courts that permit illegally obtained evidence to be used or
allow convictions resting on such evidence to stand "become instruments" of such law enforcement, or they do not. Either the
courts' duty "as agencies of justice and custodians of liberty" forbids that persons should be convicted upon evidence secured in
violation of law, or it does not.
If a federal court cannot allow a conviction resting on a federal
statutory violation to stand without making itself an "accomplice"
in the police lawlessness, then how can any court allow a conviction resting on a federal constitutional violation to stand? If permitting the use of evidence secured in disregard of statutory law
would "stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into law,"
then how can it be maintained that permitting the use of evidence
obtained by violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
does not "stultify the policy" that the Constitution has enacted
into law?
Irreconcilable Decisions?

Nor, as I see it, can the reasoning of the Court, per Justice
Frankfurter, in Wolf be squared with its reasoning, per Justice
Frankfurter, in Rochin 85-or with Frankfurter's dissent in lrvine. 86
~

ld. at 344-347.

85

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142 (1954). The Court affirmed Irvine's
for horse-race bookmaking and related offenses, even though based on
ncriminating conversations heard through a concealed microphone illegally in86

~onviction
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In striking down a conviction resting on evidence produced by
"stomach pumping"-and certainly the morphine capsules taken
from Rochin's stomach were no less trustworthy than the materials
seized from Wolf's office-the Rochin Court, per Justice Frankfurter, reminded us that "due process of law" means at least that
"convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a
sense of justice.' " 87 But don't all convictions brought about by
methods that offend due process offend "a sense of justice"?
California did not "affirmatively sanction" the police misconduct in Rochin any more than did Colorado in Wolf. The
"stomach pumping," no doubt, was a tort and a crime. Moreover,
as the Rochin Court pointed out, the brutal conduct "naturally
enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before
us." 88 Why, then, would sustaining the conviction amount to
"sanctioning" the police misconduct and "affording" it "the cloak
of law"? And if it would, why would it not in Wolf?
Nor did the Irvine Court "affirmatively sanction" the repeated
illegal entries into the petitioner's home. Justice Jackson, who
wrote the principal opinion in this case, took pains to note that
"there is no lack of remedy if an unconstitutional wrong has been
done in this instance without upsetting a justifiable conviction of
this common gambler." Rn Indeed, he went so far as to direct the
Clerk of Court "to forward a copy of the record in this case, together with a copy of this opinion, for attention of the Attorney
General of the United States." 00
stalled in petitioner's home. Justice Jackson wrote the four-man plurality opinion.
Justice Clark concurred in the result, noting that if he had been on the Court
when Wolf was decided, he would have applied the federal exclusionary rule
to the states. ld. at 138. Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, and Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justice Burton, filed separate dissents.
87

Rochin v. California, note 85 supra, at 173.

88Jd.
89

Irvine v. California, note 86 supra, at 137.

90 Id. at 138. Only Chief Justice Warren joined Justice Jackson in this regard.
The Chief Justice was "new on the job"; indeed, his nomination had not yet been
confirmed. In later years, he was to recognize that the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence "has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct
which produced the evidence." See text at note 108 infra.
Incidentally, nothing came of the federal investigation suggested by Justice
Jackson, in large part because the transgressing officers were acting under orders
of the chief of police and with the full knowledge of the local prosecutor. See
Comment, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 76, 94 n.75 (1954).
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Why, then, did Justice Frankfurter dissent in Irvine? Why did
he protest:
"Nor can we dispose of this case by satisfying ourselves that the defendant's guilt was proven by trustworthy evidence and then finding, or
devising other means whereby the police may be discouraged from using
illegal methods to acquire such evidence.
" ... If, as in Rochin, '[o]n the facts of this case the conviction of the
petitioner has been obtained by methods that offend the Due Process
Clause' [wasn't this true of Wolf?], it is no answer to say that the offending policemen and prosecutors who utilize outrageous methods should be
punished for their misconduct.

"That the prosecution in this case, with the sanction of the courts, flouted
a legislatively declared philosophy against such miscreant conduct and
made it a policy merely on paper, does not make the conduct any the
less a disregard of due process.
"Of course it is a loss to the community when a conviction is overturned
because the indefensible means by which it was obtained cannot be
squared with the commands of due process. . . . But ... [a] sturdy, selfrespecting democratic community should not put up with lawless police
and prosecutors." 9 1

Three Attempts to Reconcile Cases
I can think of only three possible ways to reconcile Wolf with
the majority opinion in Rochin, the dissents in Irvine, and the
rationale of the "involuntary" confession cases. None of them is
satisfactory:
( 1) Not all violations of the Fourth Amendment offend due
process; only certain "outrageous" or "aggravated" types of unreasonable searches and seizures do so. Although even before
Mapp v. Ohio and Ker v. California 92 I argued at considerable
length to the contrary, 93 the Wolf opinion could conceivably have
stood for, or have come to stand fur, this limited proposition. 94
91

Irvine v. California, note 86 supra, at 148-149 & n.1 (emphasis added).

92

374 U.S. 23 (1963) ("standard of reasonableness is the same under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"). See also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964) (reading Ker as holding that standard for obtaining a search warrant is
the same).
93

See note 82 supra.

94

See id.
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But today it is plain that it does not. Although some Justices have
balked at "incorporating" a specific provision of the Bill of Rights
into the Fourteenth "jot-for-jot" and "bag and baggage," especially
in the jury trial cases, it is now clear that the Court did not apply a
"watered-down" version of the Fourth Amendment to the states
but rather one that applies to the same extent it has been interpreted to apply to the federal government. 95
( 2) Evidence, verbal or real, that is the product of police
violence or brutality should be excluded, but not evidence that is
obtained by other types of police misconduct. This is the distinction that Justice Jackson drew in Irvine-and one that he sought
to make even among "involuntary" confessions. 96 But the Court
has long recognized that "involuntariness" or "coercion" need not
be based on physical violence or the threat of it. 97 Why, then,
should such violence or the threat of it be a prerequisite for excluding other unconstitutionally seized evidence? Moreover, I think it
may be confidently said that today virtually everybody would reject a rule, as did Frankfurter and the other Irvine dissenters,
whether it be a rule for "real" or verbal evidence, that "even the
most reprehensible means for securing a conviction will not taint
a verdict so long as the body of the accused was not touched by
State officials." 98
( 3) Obtaining evidence by searches or seizures that would
have violated the Fourth Amendment if conducted by federal officers does violate Fourteenth Amendment due process when made
by state officers, but the use of such evidence in state courts does
not offend due process unless the police methods involved constitute an "aggravated" or "outrageous" or "shocking" violation of
the Fourth Amendment. This, it seems to me, is the doctrine that
95 See generally Kamisar, Grano & Haddad, Criminal Procedure 12-15 (1977);
Lockhart, Kamisar & Choper, Constitutional Law 577-584 (4th ed. 1975).
96 See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 59-60 (1949) (concurring opinion). See also the comments on Justice
Jackson's views in Paulsen, "The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree,"
6 Stan. L. Rev. 411,428 (1954).
97 Thus the Court threw out the confession in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957), although "concededly, there was no brutality or physical coercion" and
"psychological coercion is by no means manifest." /d. at 200 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Spano v. New York, 360
u.s. 315 (1959).
98

Irvine v. California, note 86 supra, at 146.
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emerges from Justice Frankfurter's majority opinions in Wolf and
Rochin and his dissent in Irvine. I find it-and I hope I am not
alone-a difficult proposition, and a most curious one. It is not
easy to grasp why only one step is needed for "involuntary" confessions-whether or not secured by violence or threat of it,
whether or not independently established as true, the use of any
confession obtained in violation of due process offends due process-but two steps are required for unreasonable searches and
seizures: ( 1) Did the police violate the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments? (2) If so, by how much? Was it a "gross" violation or only a "mild" one? A "flagrant" violation or only a "routine" one?

"Minimally" Violating Rights: A Bad Proposal
Where does this "two-plimsoll mark due process" test99 come
from? Talk about "judicially created rules of evidence"! Where
is this written-indeed, even implied-in the Constitution? Next
to this test, surely, the Weeks Court's reading of the Fourth
Amendment and the Mapp Court's reading of the Fourth and
Fourteenth seem like pretty straightforward interpretations of the
Constitution.
To say that police conduct is unconstitutional, that it violates
the minimal standards of due process, is as bad a label as one can
put on police misconduct, is it not? How then can it be said that
still more is required for exclusion? Why then must the police
be found to have violated subminimal standards?
How does one "barely" or "mildly" violate what is "basic to a
free society" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"? If
police action that violates due process is not gross or aggravated
police misconduct per se, then why is it a violation of due process?
As Professor Allen has observed:
"To label a right 'basic to a free society' is to say about as much as can
be said. Yet Wolf refused to vindicate these rights by reversal of the
conviction. Given Wolf, how are the rights flouted by the Los Angeles

9 9 Cf. Frankfurter, J., concurring in Fikes v. Alabama, note 97 supra, at 199:
"I cannot escape the conclusion . . . that in combination [these circumstances]
bring the result below the Plimsollline of 'due process.' " See Field, "Frankfurter,
J., Concurring," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1957); Kamisar, note 82 supra, at 11211129.
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police in Irvine to be characterized? There is a certain inelegance in
speaking of rights 'very basic to a free society' or in indulging in what
appears to be almost a comparison of superlatives." 100

My purpose in comparing the reasoning in Wolf with that in
McNabb, Rochin, and other cases, and with what might be called
the "imperative of judicial integrity" consideration in the confession area/ 01 is not to demonstrate that the Court, or Justice Frankfurter in particular, was inconsistent. That is to be expected. Indeed, that is almost inevitable. After all, Justice Frankfurter sat
on the Supreme Court for more than twenty years, and few judges,
if any, who have served half as long have not been inconsistent. I
hasten to add that the same may be said for those who contribute
to the law reviews over any substantial stretch of time. (I am the
first to admit that there are inconsistencies in what I am saying
about the exclusionary rule today and in what I have written about
the same subject on other occasions.)

The Judge's Job: Drawing the Line
My purpose, rather, is to provide "education in the obvious" 102 :
Jmost no sensitive judge can take seriously or live with the imlications of Wolf. At some point, he will not care about or even
mink about "alternatives" to the remedy of exclusion; he will exclude the evidence however logically relevant and verifiable it be,
or, if the court below admitted it, he simply will not let the conviction stand. At some point he will be unable to do otherwise. When
that point is reached, he will do what a majority did in Rochin and
some would have done in Irvine: He will refuse "to have a hand
in such dirty business." 103 This is why the Weeks Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, Wigmore's famous criticism
to the contrary notwithstanding, 104 is, if not perfectly logical, quite
understandable-one might even say quite natural.
1oo Allen, note 81 supra, at 9. See also Kamisar, note 82 supra, at 1121-1124.
1o1

Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).

102

Holmes, "Law and the Court," in Collected Legal Papers 291, 292 (1920).

1oa Holmes, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470
(1928). As I read Holmes' dissent, he did not, as many seem to think, regard
wiretapping as inherently "ignoble" or "immoral," but only wiretapping-or for
that matter, any other means of obtaining evidence by the government-that constituted a specific violation of the law. This was the "dirty business."
104

See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2184, at 35, 40 (3d ed. 1940).
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The Weeks Court believed, or felt, this point was reached when
the police violated the Fourth Amendment; the Rochin Court and
the Irvine dissenters believed, or felt, that it was reached when the
police violated some subminimal standard. But the response was
the same: We don't care about possible tort actions or other possible "alternative remedies"! The government obtained the conviction by "indefensible means." 105 We, the judges, cannot "sanction" this. We, the judges, cannot afford it "the cloak of law" and
"should not [and will not] put up" with this. 106
To say that most judges have what might be called a "threshold" for excluding trustworthy evidence is not to deny that the
threshold varies considerably among them-or even that, over the
years, it may shift significantly in the mind or heart of an individual judge.
"Threshold for Exclusion"

In his decade and a half as Chief Justice of the United States,
for example, Earl Warren's "threshold for exclusion" lowered quite
a bit. In his first year on the Court, he joined in Justice Jackson's
principal opinion in Irvine, upholding a conviction based on "incredible" police misconduct but assuring us that "admission of the
evidence does not exonerate the officers . . . if they have violated
defendant's Constitutional rights" 107-"there is no lack of remedy
if an unconstitutional wrong has been done in this instance without
upsetting [the] conviction." 108 Seven years later, however, the
Chief justice joined in the opinion for the Court in Mapp. And another seven years later, very close to the end of his career, he observed for the Court in the "stop and frisk" cases:
"Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made
party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by per105 See text at note 91 supra. Are not all unconstitutional means of obtaining
evidence to secure a conviction "indefensible"? And if not, why are they unconstitutional?
106 See text at note 91 supra. If alternative means of punishing or discouraging governmental lawlessness are available (at least theoretically), as they were
in Rochin and Irvine, why does admitting the evidence constitute "put[ting] up
with lawless police and prosecutors"? And if it does, why did the Court "put up"
with the governmental lawlessness in Wolf?
1o1

Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).

108Jd.
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mitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. Thus
in our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial
process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting
with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state
agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has
the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.
" ... When [unconstitutional] conduct is identified, it must be condemned
by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials." 109

Justices Holmes and Brandeis seem to have had a consistently
low "threshold for exclusion." In Fourteenth Amendment due
process cases, at least, Justice Jackson seems to have had a consistently high one. For him, unconstitutional police conduct was
not enough. Nor even "serious" or "aggravated" unconstitutional
conduct. It had to involve physical violence or brutality as well.
That a judge is more likely to give short shrift to alternatives
to the remedy of exclusion in a "shocking" case of police misconduct than in a routine one is hardly surprising. But is it logical?
If police misconduct is ever going to attract the interest of the
press, arouse community opinion, and excite the sympathy of
jurors, it is going to do so in the sensational or shocking case (such
as Rochin and Irvine)-not the "routine" or "mild" unconstitutional search and seizure case (such as Wolf).
Rule Needed More Where Other Remedies Nonexistent
This is why-although his reasoning must seem curious to
many of us who have grown up with Wolf, Rochin, and Irvine-a
leading proponent of the exclusionary rule maintained, some fifty
years ago, that infringements of the Fourth Amendment that generate the least public outcry pose the strongest case for exclusion. 110
"The more violent and obvious infringement," he was willing to
concede, "may be curtailed through civil or criminal actions against
the guilty officers." 111
lODTerryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 15 (1968).
110

Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures," 25 Colum. L. Rev. 11, 24 (1925).
111Jd.
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It would be hard to deny that a court's refusal to permit the use
of evidence obtained by "obvious" or "shocking" police misconduct
is, at least in some measure, "symbolic." It signifies, to the police
officer and to the general public alike, the court's disapproval-its
unwillingness to "put up with"-the underlying police lawlessness.
But if this is true in a case where the alternative remedies of tort
actions, criminal prosecutions, and internal discipline are most
likely to be effective, how can it be any less so when the court allows the evidence to be used in a not-so-shocking case of unconstitutional police conduct-and thus one where alternatives to the
remedy of exclusion are unlikely, or at least less likely, to amount
to anything?
Does a court that admits the evidence in such a case not manifest a willingness to "put up with" the unconstitutional conduct
that produced it? If so, how can the police and the citizenry be
expected "to believe that the government truly meant to forbid the
conduct in the first place"? 112 Why should the police or the public
accept the argument that the availability of "alternative remedies"
permits the court to admit the evidence without "sanctioning" the
underlying misconduct when the greater possibility of alternative
remedies in the "flagrant" or "willful" case does not allow the
court to do so?
Does a court that admits the evidence, then, in a case involving a "run of the mill" Fourth Amendment violation not demonstrate an insufficient commitment to the guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure, not demonstrate "the contrast between
morality professed by society and immorality practiced on its
behalf," 113 not signify that government officials need not, or at
least need not always, "be subjected to the same rules of conduct
that are commands to the citizen"? 114
Where should the "threshold for exclusion" be put? At what
point should a judge say that the police misconduct is so "indefensible" or "offensive" as to warrant throwing out the evidence it
112 Paulsen, "The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police," 52 J.
Crim. L.C. & P.S. 255, 258 ( 1961), reprinted in Police Power and Individual
Freedom 87, 90 (Sowle, Ed., 1962).
113 Frankfurter, J., dissenting in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 759
(1952).
11 4

Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471,
485 (1928).
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produced? To say that this point is not reached until the police
have resorted to violence or brutality or that it is not reached unless
they have perpetrated some "gross" or "serious" or "aggravated"
violation of the Constitution seems neither a principled nor a manageable way to go about it.
Conclusion: Exclude All Unconstitutional Police Conduct
If the line must be drawn somewhere (and I believe most
judges rightly think that it must-or will feel that it must when
the appropriate case arises), I can think of no more logical and
fitting place to draw it than at unconstitutional police conduct
(however "mild," "technical," or "inadvertent" some may label
that unconstitutional conduct) .115

115 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)
(evidence should not be excluded when seized by an officer "acting in the goodfaith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable
grounds for this [good-faith] belief"); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-611
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (distinguishing between "flagrantly
abusive" Fourth Amendment violations and "technical" or "good faith" violations); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("inadvertent" or "honest mistakes" by police
should not be treated in the same way as "deliberate and flagrant Irvine-type
violations of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443,
451-452 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (officer's error "so minuscule
and pardonable" as to render exclusion of evidence inappropriate); Model Code
of Prearraignment Procedure § SS 290.2 (Official Draft I 97 5) (evidence shall
be excluded only :f violation upon which it was based was "substantial"; all violations shall be deemed substantial if "gross, wilful and prejudicial to accused";
otherwise, court shall consider, inter alia, "the extent of deviation from lawful
conduct" and "the extent to which the violation was wilful"); Griswold, Search
and Seizure: A Dilemma of the Supreme Court 58 (1975) (officer should be
supported if he "acted decently" and "did what you would expect a good, careful,
conscientious police officer to do under the circumstances").
If the officer, as Dean Griswold described it, acted in the manner that "a good,
careful, conscientious police officer" is expected to act, or if, as Judge Friendly
maintained in Soyka, supra, the officer's error was "so minuscule and pardonable
as to render the drastic sanction of exclusion ... almost grotesquely inappropriate," then the error should not render the search or seizure "unreasonable" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as the Second Circuit held on rehearing
en bane in Soyka, supra, at 452. After all, probable cause is supposed to turn on
"the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act" (Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175 (1949)); and affidavits are supposed to be interpreted in a "commonsense"
rather than a "hypertechnical" manner (United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
109 ( 1965) ) .
In light of existing law, the proposals or suggestions to modify the exclusionary
rule must mean that the challenged evidence should be admissible even when the
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When Justice Frankfurter argued that the Court should reverse
in Irvine, although it affirmed the conviction in Wolf, because the
Irvine police misconduct was more shocking and offensive, Justice
Jackson responded: "Actually, the search [in Wolf] was offensive
to the law in the same respect, if not the same degree, as here." 116
I think Justice Jackson was right (but for the wrong reason). Once
the Court identifies the police action as unconstitutional, that ought
to be the end of the matter. There should be no "degrees" of "offensiveness" among different varieties of unconstitutional police
conduct. A violation of the Constitution ought to be the "bottom
line." This, I always thought, is supposed to be the "bottom line."
This is where the Weeks and Mapp Courts drew the line. This is
where it ought to stay drawn.
Addendum: Empirical Studies and Deterrence
Professor Dallin Oaks' much-cited "empirical challenge" to the
exclusionary rule 117 was undeniably an important contribution in
its time, but more recent and more comprehensive studies and
analyses have cast grave doubt on his conclusions and inferences
about the rule's inefficacy in affecting police behavior. Moreover,
these more recent analyses have highlighted the insufficiency and
inappropriateness of the Oaks data. 118
officer acted unreasonably (i.e., negligently), so long as his misconduct was not
deliberate or reckless but "inadvertent." On this issue (although I disagree with
him on a number of other points), I share Professor Kaplan's concern that such
a modification of the rule "would put a premium on the ignorance of the police
officer and, more significantly, on the department which trains him." Kaplan
"would add one more factfinding operation, and an especially difficult one to
administer, to those already required of a lower judiciary which, to be frank, has
hardly been very trustworthy in this area," and he states that so long as so many
trial judges remain hostile to the exclusionary rule, "the addition of another especially subjective factual determination will constitute almost an open invitation
to nullification at the trial court level" (Kaplan, "The Limits of the Exclusionary
Rule," 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1044, 1045 ( 1974). See also Proceedings of 48th
Annual Meeting of ALI 374-398 (1971) (debate on Model Prearraignment Code
.. proposal, supra, to exclude illegally obtained evidence only when underlying violation was "substantial").
116

Irvine v. California, note 107 supra, at 133.

117

See Oaks, "Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure," 37 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 665-667 (1970).
118 See generally Canon, "Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some
New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion," 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 697717, 725-727 (1974). See also Canon, "Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liber-
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For example, Oaks 119 and Spiotto120 rely on the high frequency
with which motions to suppress are granted in Chicago gambling,
narcotics, and weapons cases to conclude that, long after adoption
of the exclusionary rule, illegal searches and seizures are commonplace in the enforcement of these offenses by the Chicago police.
Canon points out why "counting successful motions is an imperfect indicator [of the rule's effectiveness] for several reasons" and
concludes that, in any event, Chicago is "a gross exception to the
national norm of granting suppression motions." 121 Canon's study
of sixty-five cities indicates that in 60 percent the motions to
suppress were granted one-tenth of the time or less and in 91
percent such motions were granted one-fourth of the time or
less. 122 Moreover, comments Canon, "judges in Chicago have long
been noted for their willingness to grant motions to suppress
evidence," and "it is sometimes alleged that Chicago police habitually conduct vice raids in a manner that ensures that a motion to
suppress will be successful." 123
To take another example (the reader will find many more in
the Canon article), Oaks' study of arrest before and after Mapp
focused on one city, Cincinnati. He concluded that the adoption
of the exclusionary rule had had virtually no effect on the number
of arrests for narcotics, weapons, and gambling in that city. 124 But
Canon gathered similar data for fourteen cities (including Cincinnati) and found that only four others had the "rather minimal
ties Policies at the State and Federal Levels," 5 Am. Politics Q. 57, 71-75 (1977);
Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 220-254 (1976); Washy, Small Town
Police and the Supreme Court 25-34, 81-117, 217-229 (1976) (study of southern
Illinois and western Massachusetts police); cf. "Critique," 69 Nw. U.L. Rev. 740
(1974) (devastating criticism of the Spiotto study, infra).
119

See Oaks, note 117 supra, at 681-689, 706-707.

120

Spiotto, "Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary
Rule and Its Alternatives," 2 J. Legal Stud. 243, 245-248 (1973) (in many respects a continuation of the Oaks study, but a less scholarly effort).
1 21

Canon, "Exclusionary Rule," note 118 supra, at 718, 721.

122

Id. at 722.

123 /d. at 720. See also Washy, note 118 supra, at 108-117, 217-223 (some
judges granted a substantial number of motions to suppress "during the educational process" immediately following adoption of the exclusionary rule, but
"police improvement and accommodation to the rules" meant that after this
transitional period few motions were granted).
124

See Oaks, note 117 supra, at 707.
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response pattern that Cincinnati has." 125 At the other end of the
spectrum, the Baltimore decreases in arrests following Mapp "were
both dramatically sudden and truly spectacular." 126 "Baltimore is
probably an extreme case and is illustrated to counter Oaks' generalizations about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule from the
presentation of Cincinnati's arrest figures. Buffalo is less extreme
but not necessarily typical. Indeed, it is not at all clear that there is
a typical response to the exclusionary rule." 127
Canon also noted that political scientist Michael Ban had concluded, after an in-depth study of Mapp's impact in Boston and
Cincinnati, that "the Cincinnati political milieu ... permitted widespread disregard if not defiance of the Supreme Court's ruling,"
and that in a number of respects there was "a discernably lesser
propensity for compliance in Cincinnati than in Boston." 128
At the present time, there is much to be said for lawyer-political
scientist Donald Horowitz's analysis of Mapp and police behavior129:
"Much of the empirical support for the proposition that Mapp does not
deter the police from violating the Fourth Amendment has been quite
crude. . . . [T]hat illegal searches are still conducted to obtain evidence
of certain kinds of crimes does not mean that they are still conducted
with the same frequency for evidence of other kinds of crimes. That
illegal searches are common in some cities does not mean that they are
equally common in all cities. Deterrence cannot be viewed as 'a monolithic governmental enterprise.'
"Gradually, the rudiments of a more discriminating approach have begun
to emerge. What it suggests is that the extent to which police behavior
is modified by Mapp depends on a complex set of local conditions, including ... the type of offense involved, the particular police unit responsible for specific enforcement tasks, and the way in which local
courts and lawyers handle search-and-seizure matters. . . .
" ... [T]he fragments indicate it is a mistake to think that police behavior is never conditioned by the sanction of excluding evidence that
might lead to conviction. . . . [I]n the case of serious crimes the police-

125 See Canon, "Exclusionary Rule," note 121 supra, at 706.
126 ld. at 704.
127 ld. at 705.
128 /d. at 689, 698 (Canon's characterization of Ban's findings,

which, although
unpublished, have been widely circulated among political scientists).

12 9 Horowitz,

note 118 supra, at 224-225, 230-231, 250.
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man starts thinking fairly early of what is required to convict, and some
of the things he thinks of are the restrictive rules of arrest and search.
Even in less serious cases, there is some evidence of officers' disappointment with their inability to get Fourth Amendment requirements straight,
when motions to suppress evidence have been granted. 130 Policemen
often debate with prosecutors the appropriate charges to be lodged
against suspects the police have apprehended. . . . Sample surveys of
police attitudes toward the courts repeatedly show profound police disappointment with the courts for imposing little or no punishment on so
many criminals ....
". . . Blanket assertions that the police generally are unconcerned about
conviction fail to account for many aspects of police behavior. . . .
[C]oncern with .conviction is very much a function of locale, offense,
stage of investigation, and sometimes police unit involved. Receptivity
to the judicial sanction varies accordingly."

In closing these necessarily brief remarks on the "empirical
challenge" to the exclusionary rule, I cannot resist pointing out
that at the same time some critics of the rule are urging its elimination or substantial modification on the ground, inter alia, that
it has had little if any effect on police behavior and little if any
impact on the amount of pre-Mapp illegality, other critics are calling for the rule's repeal or revision on the ground, inter alia, that in
recent years the police have attained such a high incidence of compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements that "the absolute
sanctions of the Exclusionary Rule are no longer necessary to
'police' them." 131 In an amicus brief, the Supreme Court was presented with the results of a study of warrantless searches and seizures. Such searches and seizures were chosen because they are
the ones "in which the officer is acting on his own with no assistance from a magistrate or prosecuting attorney, cases in which his
activity must stand or fall based on his own judgment, knowledge
of search and seizure restrictions, and his desire to abide by such
restrictions." IR~ According to this study, of more than a thousand
cases involving warrantless searches and seizures decided by appellate courts nationwide during the twenty-seven-month period of
130

0n this point, see also Wasby, note 118 supra, at 112-114,217-218.

131

Brief of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 12, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), discussed in Comment, 65 J. Crim. L. & C. 373, 383 (1974).
132

/d. at 16.
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January 1970 through March 1972, 84 percent (1,157 of 1,371)
were found to be proper-"an extraordinary high degree of police
professionalism." 133
The amicus brief denies that this study evidences any beneficial
exclusionary-rule influence on law enforcement, 134 but I doubt
that many will find the denial convincing. "[T]his excellent record
of successful police compliance with the rules of search and seizure" ~ is attributed to "police professionalism"-an attempt by
most police to learn "at least in a general way the restrictions on
their search and seizure activities and a good faith desire to comport themselves properly within such restrictions." 136
But what stimulated the attempt by most officers to familiarize
themselves, at least in a general way, with the law of search and
seizure? Perhaps, just perhaps, it was the exclusionary rule.
1
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5

/d. at 17.

13 4/d.

at 18.

135Jd.
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/d. at 19.

CLIENT CONFIDENCE IN COUNSEL SURVEYED

A recent survey conducted for the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration showed that 49 percent of indigent criminal suspects
surveyed had no faith in their government-funded lawyers. The respondents felt the lawyers were "on the side of the state."
As for private practitioners, only 6 percent of the respondents
didn't trust their attorneys. The survey found that these clients saw
their counsel as real-life Perry Masons.
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